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MISSOURI SECTION
NOTES
THE McNABB RULE AND THE MISSOURI COURTS
In the federal courts illegal detention will cause a confession to be
inadmissible at trial as a matter of law. The Missouri courts have
refused to adopt this rule. This note will consider the federal rule,
Missouri's refusal to follow the rule, and the procedure in this state
by which the admissibility of a confession is questioned.
I
In 1943 the Supreme Court, in McNabb v. United States,, ruled
that detention in violation of a statute2 interpreted to require that an
arrested person must be taken within a reasonable time before the
nearest judicial officer having jurisdiction would render inadmissible,
as a matter of law, a confession obtained during the illegal period of
detention. The rule was declared to be a sanction to enforce compliance
with the statute and the policy behind the statute. The decision was
based upon the Court's power to make rules governing criminal proce-
dure in the federal courts,4 rather than upon the Constitution5 or the
1: 318 U.S. 332 (1943). See also Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350
(194:3); 56 HARV. L. REV. 1008 (1943).
2. 28 STAT. 416 (1894).
3. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 342-344 (1943). It is interesting to
note that the statute involved in the case is one controlling the payment of fees to
the vaijous personnel of the Department of Justice. A reading of the entire act
discloses that the legislature did not have in mind the controlling of third degree
methods or development of any "civilized standard" of police administration. 28
STAT. 41, (1894). See Inbau, The Confession Dilena in the United States
.upre ico Coirt, 43 ILl. L. REV. 442, 445 (1948).
4. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943):
In the exercise of its supervisory authority over the administration of crimi-
nal justice in the federal courts.., this court has, from the very beginning
of its history, formulated rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal
prosecutions....
1,1. at 347:
\]e coutine ourselves to our limited function as a court of ultimate review
of tbe standards formulated and applied by federal courts in the trial of
ci iminal cases....
The inconsistency with which the rule has been applied by the Court has given
ise to speculation that perhaps it is founded on some other principle than the
Court's power of supervision over the procedure and practice of federal courts in
the trial o f criminal cases. The question soon arose in United States v. Mitchell,
:122 U.S. (15 (1944), where the rule was not applied to a confession obtained while
detention was legal though it later became illegal. This was inconsistent with the
concept of the rule being a sanction. Note, 47 CoL. L. REV. 1214 (1947). But ef.
Upshaw v. United States, :335 U.S. 410 (1948), indicating the contrary. Nor does
it appear from the language used by the Court or the application of the rule that
it could b,! an exclusionary rule of evidence based on truthfulness. Upshaw v.
Unitedt States, ltopif; Mcol abb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). But -ee
United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 539-541 (1947), where a second confession
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traditional test of voluntariness.8 A short time later in United States
v. Mitchel ,7 however, the Court indicated that there were to be narrow
restrictions to the rule. The Mitchell case was misleading, for in
Upashw v. United Statesg the broad terms of the McNabb case were
again used, dispelling any hope that the rule was to be strictly con-
strued.
Even before the pronouncement of the McNabb Rule there was
evidence of legislative disapproval of laws restricting police arraign-
ment and detention procedures? Shortly after the McNabb decision
the Hobbs bill, which would have nullified the decision, was intro-
obtained six months after the first confession had been excluded under the Mc-
Nabb rule and supplemental to the first was allowed into evidence.
It has also been suggested by some writers that the rule is no more than a pre-
sumption of fact that where there has been illegal detention the confession was
involuntary Notes, 47 CoL. L. REv. 1214 (1947); 21 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 98(1949); 53 YAM L.J. 758 (1944). It is doubtful that such a conclusion can be
sustained in light of the Upshaw case and because such a rule would seem to find
its basis in the due process clause of the Constitution. See Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278 (1936) (dealing with coercion by physical violence). These positions
cannot be sustained in light of recent language of the Court:
The rule of the McNabb case.., is not a limitation imposed by the Due
Process Clause.... Compliance with the McNabb rule is required in federal
courts by this Court through its power of supervision over procedure and
practices of federal couts in the trial of criminal cases. That power over
state criminal trials is not vested in this Court....
Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 (1951).
5. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340, 341 (1943):
In the view we take of the case, however, it becomes unnecessary to reach
the constitutional issue pressed upon us....
Quite apart from the Constitution, therefore, we are constrained to hold that
the evidence elicited from the petitioners in the circumstances disclosed here
must be excluded....
6. Id. at 340, 341:
Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards
of procedure and evidence. Such standards are not satisfied merely by ob-
servance of those minimal historic safeguards for securing trial by reason
which are summarized as "due process of law" and below which we reach
what is really trial by force....
The principles governing the admissibility of evidence in federal criminal
trials have not been restricted, therefore, to those derived solely from the
Constitution.... And in formulating such rules of evidence for federal
criminal trials the Court has been guided by considerations of justice not
limited to the strict canons of evidentiary relevance.
7. 322 U.S. 65, 69-70 (1944) (confession obtained before detention became
illegal). The Court indicated that the confession had to be obtained during the
period of illegal detention and that if it was obtained while the detention was
legal, the McNabb rule was not applicable. See Note, 53 YALE L.J. 758, 765(1944).
8. 335 U.S. 410 (1948). See 62 HARV. L. Rfv. 696 (1949).
9. A bill backed by the American Civil Liberties Union in the New York
Legislature, dealing with removing the custody of prisoners from the control of
the police and prosecution and putting it in the hands of the court, was defeated.
See Assem. J. 162d Sess. 1939, vol. I, p.453 Int. 1336; id. 163 Sess. 1940 vol. I,
p.4 4 Int. 182, Int. 188; Sen. J. 162d Sess. 1939, vol. I, p.2 9 1 Int. 920. 6 itation
taken from Fraenkel, From Suspicion to Accusation, 51 YALE L.J. 748, 758(1942).
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duced in Congress.' The bill gained widespread support, not only
from legislators but also from persons in law enforcement agencies.
The bill was dropped, however, after the Mitchell case had apparently
greatly limited the rule." During this same period there was an
attempt to incorporate the McNabb Rule as part of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure in rule 5.12 This move was defeated, but there
was a partial victory as commitment section 5(a) did slightly alter
the former arraignment statutes by stating that the arresting officer
". . shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before
the nearest available commissioner. . . . " It appears that this
slight change will have no effect on the rule but will merely give the
Court another standard in determining when detention becomes
illegal.
Desirable as civilized standards in police administration may be,
yet the principle of the McNabb case has not been considered favor-
ably, nor does it appear to be the proper answer.14 The practical and
philosophical objections to the rule are beyond the scope of this note,
as are the several proposed methods of reaching the same end result.1
10. Hearings before Subcommittee 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R.
'690, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1944). For the history of the bill and the general
critical attitude toward the McNabb case see 90 CoNG. RE. 9197-9200 (1944); 90
CoNG. RE(. 9366-9376 (1944); 91 CONG. RwE. 2505-2508 (1945); 92 CONG. REO.
10379-10380 (1946); 93 CONG. Rsc. 1376-1387 (1947). The expressed purpose of
the bill was to nullify the McNabb case. In effect the bill provided: Failure of
compliance with the commitment statutes does not render inadmissible evidence
otherwise admissible. It is also noted that the bil expressly stated that no such
policy as that stated in the McNabb case underlies the arraignment statutes. It
is interesting to note that Mr. Kefauver proposed an amendment to the Hobbs bill
which was a consolidation of all arraignment statutes into one. 90 CoNG. REG.
9367 (1944).
A reading of the bill and the discussion thereon clearly indicates that the
legislation was fostered by people sympathetic to the problems of law enforce-
ment. See 42 Micl. L. REV. 679, 689-691 (1944), for a reprint of a letter by Mr. J.
Edgar Hoover to the Secretary of the Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure in which Mr. Hoover points out what possible retarding effects the
I1f Nabb rule can have on criminal investigation.
1i. See note 10 supra.
12. PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF FED. RULES CR. PRoc. (1943).
13. FET,. RULES CR. PRoc. rule 5(a), 18 U.S.C.A.
14. Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133 (1953);
Inbau, Co,fession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILl. L. RIEV.
442 (1948); McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of
Confe.c.ions, 24 Trx. L. REv. 239 (1946); Notes, 47 COL. L. REV. 1214 (1947); 42
Micu. L. Rnv. 679 (1944); 21 RocKy MT. L. Rm. 98 (1949); 53 YAx L.. 758(1944). For the attitude of writers on the problem prior to the McNabb case
see Fraenkel, From Suspicion to Accusation, 51 YArx L.J. 748 (1942); McCormick,
The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEx. L. REv. 447, 452-457(19:38).
15. in Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.. 133, 176(1953), the author in speaking of the McNabb and similar cases has illustrated
that the answer does not lie in judicial legislation:
These cases compel us to face the fact that sometimes judicial decisions, if
they do not aggravate present difficulties, do not contribute appreciably to
their solution. For example, whatever view one takes of the McNabb rule-
that a confession obtained during illegal detention without the slightest
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II
The commitment statutes of Missouri command that a person
arrested without warrant or process shall be released within twenty
(20) hours if not committed ;" or if arrested by the highway patrol
he is to be taken forthwith before a magistrate ;'T and if the arrested
person is an escapee, he is to be taken before a magistrate imme-
diately.'s A reading of the cases indicates that violations of these
statutes are not unusual.
Before the McNabb case the Missouri Supreme Court had been
presented with the theory that a confession should be inadmissible
because of illegal detention, but at that time the contention was re-
jected the McNabb Rule.2 2 One judge, who had indicated before these
case the court was confronted directly with the issue in Stcte v. Ellis"0
and State a. Sanford.F The majority of the court unqualifiedly re-
jected the McNabb rule.21 One judge, who had indicated before these
cases that he had been influenced by the McNabb decision,23 dissented
rather strongly.2& At present, however, the dissenting judge appears
to have reconsidered his earlier positions and now stands with the
majority in rejecting the rule.2 5
The Missouri courts are not required to follow the McNabb case
since it is based on the Supreme Court's power to declare rules
governing criminal procedure in federal courts which are not binding
on the states. Evidently either the Missouri Supreme Court sees no
need for the rule as a sanction to the commitment statutes or believes
coercion, physical or psychological, is inadmissible-the unfortunate fact is
that the rule widens the gap between law and police practices. And the
dubious efficacy of dealing with serious abuses indirectly, by a rule of evi-
dence, again embasizes the need of actual remedies for harms committed by
officials as well as of discipline and better training of the police.
For other suggested remedies see Inbau, Confession Dilemma in the United States
Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. Rav. 442 (1948); Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28
VA. L. RaV. 315 (1942) ; Note, 53 YALu L.J. 758 (1944).
16. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 544.170 (1949).
17. Mo. REv. STAT. § 43.210 (1949).
18. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 544.130 (1949).
19. State v. Menz, 341 Mo. 74, 94, 106 S.W.2d 440, 450 (1937), in which the
court said:
There is nothing in the proposition that the failure to release a person
upon the expiration of twenty hours . . . a charge not having been filed,
constitutes, as a matter of law, such duress as to render any statement or
confession made thereafter to an officer presumptively involuntary....
See also State v. Mitchell, 339 Mo. 228, 96 S.W.2d 341 (1936); State v. Hoskins,
327 Mo. 313, 36 S.W.2d 909 (1931); State v. Raftery, 252 Mo. 72, 158 S.W. 585
(1913).
20. i354 Mo. 998, 193 S.W.2d 31. The concurring and dissenting opinions ap-
pear under State v. Sanford 193 S.W.2d 37 (Mo. 1946).
21. 354 Mo. 1012, 193 S.W.2d 35 (1946).
22. State v. Ellis, 354 Mo. 998, 1005, 193 S.W.2d 31, 34 (1946).
23. See opinion by Tipton, J. writing for the court in Skiba v. Kaiser, 352 Mo.
424, 429, 178 S.W.2d 373, 376 (1944).
24. State v. Ellis, 354 Mo. 998, 1007 (State v. Sanford) 193 S.W.2d 37, 38
(1946) (dissent by Tipton, J.).
25. State v. Lee, 361 Mo. 163, 166, 233 S.W.2d 666, 668 (1950).
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that it is not its duty to provide such a sanction. The traditional test
of voluntariness (covered in section III infra) is established in this
state by a long line of decisions; the court feels that the test is ade-
quate and that there should be no deviation from it. The court has
also declared that the McNabb Rule has no place in the voluntary test:
It does not make any difference in so far as a prisoner is con-
Cerned whether a warrent has been or has not been issued. In
either case the prisoner is in custody and the fact that a warrant
has been issued does not render the confinement any more com-
fortable. The ultimate question must be, was the confession
\ oluntarily made.2 1
It may be noticed at this point, that Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who
wrote the majority opinion of the McNabb case, joined Mr. Justice
Jackson in Galegos v. Nebraska, in pointing out what disastrous
effects could result if the MONabb Rule was made binding upon the
states."
Missouri's rejection of the rule has been complete.2 The court ap-
parently does not even consider illegal detention as one of the factors
that could make a confession involuntary.", The court has indicated
that it is error in this state to instruct the jury that "illegal" custody
is a factor which can be taken into account when determining the ad-
missibility of a confession 1 This position seems to be consistent with
the views of the Bar Association in this state as illustrated by its re-
jection of an attempt to incorporate the McNabb Rule in the Mis-
souri Proposed Code of Evidence."
III
The basic principle upon which the admissibility of a confession is
determined is whether the facts surrounding the confession, in human
26. See note 22 supra.
27. State v. Bradford, 362 Mo. 226, 231, 240 S.W.2d 930, 933 (1951).
28. 342 U.S. 55, 72-73 (1951).
29. See e.g., State v. Bradford, 362 Mo. 226, 240 S.W.2d 930 (1951) ; State v.
Lee, 361 Mo. 163, 233 S.W.2d 666 (1950); State v. Higden, 356 Mo. 1058, 204
S.W.2d 754 (1947); State v. Golden, 353 Mo. 585, 183 S.W.2d 109 (1944). See
note 22 supra.
30. See State v. Ellis, 354 Mo. 998, 1004, 193 S.W.2d 31, 34 (1946). At trial
Ellis was given a requested instruction which told the jury that if his confession
was involuntary because of flattery, hope, torture, fear or as a result of long pro-
tracted questioning, they should reject the confession. An instruction that would
have withdrawn the confession from the jury, if they found that Ellis had not
been committed in accordance with the statute, was rejected.
Though there is language in the Ellis case that could lead to a contrary conclu-
sion, in State v. Higdon, 356 Mo. 1058, 204 S.W.2d 754 (1947), the court cleared
any possible ambiguity by stating that an instruction on illegal detention was not
required even where illegal detention was a fact before the jury.
31. State v. Aitkens, 352 Mo. 746, 179 S.W.2d 84 (1944). See also State v.
Golden, 353 Mo. 585, 183 S.W.2d 109 (1944).
32. McCormick, Impressions of the Proposed Mllissour i Evidence Code, 17 KAN.
CITY L. REv. 4, 5 (1949).
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probability, support the truthfulness of the confession. 3 Normally
the courts verbalize this principle in terms of voluntariness' and in
so doing have to some extent shifted the emphasis from the depend-
ability of the confession to the willingness of the defendant to make
the statement. The test in this form has served as the traditional
criteria and veritable rule of thumb for the United States Supreme
CourV5
In Missouri a criminal confession must be "voluntary" to be ad-
mitted into evidence at trial.'5 At one time the test was based upon
the literal definition of the word and it was stated that the confession
must be spontaneous, of the defendant's own will, without influence
or impelled by others.37 The court, however, has declared that this
test was too broad, and now states it in negative terms: "The ultimate
question is whether the accused acts on his own judgment and volition
uninfluenced by methods and devices employed by the officers which
the law denounced."' 88 As has been pointed out, illegal custody is not
considered to fall within the statement "methods and devices employed
by officers which the law denounced.'3 0
On behalf of the state it is inferred that all confessions offered
into evidence are voluntary.40 The defendant must raise, by timely
objection, the question of whether the confession is valid.41 When
the objection is made the inference of voluntariness drops out and
the burden is on the state to prove that the confession was volun-
tary.4 The burden is the risk of nonpersuasion and not merely that
of going forward with the evidence. When a proper and timely ob-
jection is taken, the trial judge is to hold a preliminary hearing away
from the jury to hear the evidence on the issue." The defendant, al-
though he may not be denied the opportunity to present all relevant
33. WiG zop, Ev=WNCE § 822 (1940). See also Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896).
34. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Wilson v. United States, 162
U.S. 613 (1896). Dean Wigmore is not in accord with the test verbalized in terms
of voluntariness. WmioP, EvDENC §§ 824, 825, 826, 843 (1940).
35. Ibid.
36. See notes 22, 30 supra. See 20 KAN. CiTy L. REV. 66 (1952), for a discus-
sion on Missouri law as to what is voluntary or involuntary.
37. See State v. White, 330 Mo. 737, 745, 51 S.W.2d 109, 113 (1932) ; State v.
Hershon, 329 Mo. 469, 483, 45 S.W.2d 60, 65 (1931) ; State v. Lowry, 321 Mo. 870,
881, 12 S.W.2d 469, 473 (1928).
38. State v. Gibilterra, 342 Mo. 577, 588, 116 S.W.2d 88, 95 (1938).
39. See notes 31, 32 supra. See WGM01M, EviDENCE, § 823 (1940).
40. State v. Higdon, 356 Mo. 1058, 204 S.W.2d 754 (1947); State v. Menz, 341
Mo. 74, 106 S.W.2d 440 (1937).
41. State v. Gibilterra, 342 Mo. 577, 116 S.W.2d 88 (1938) ; State v. Menz, 341
Mo. 74, 106 S.W.2d 440 (1937).
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
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evidence at the hearing, may withhold it for presentment to the jury."4
If, on the evidence at the hearing, the judge finds that the confession
was involunary, he may so rule as a matter of law and the issue is
closed. If, on the other hand, he is not convinced that the confession
was involuntary, the confession is admitted into evidence and the
evidence on the question of voluntariness is presented to the jury, for
it to determine under proper instruction whether or not the confes-
sion was involuntary."
The defendant is not entitled to an instruction on the issue as a
matter of course. This issue of voluntariness is only a collateral
issue in the case and not an issue of law under the instructions
statute. '7 Absent a proper request the trial judge commits no error in
failing to give an instruction on voluntariness.4" Also, if there has
been no evidence to show that the confession was involuntary it is not
error to refuse a requested instruction on the issue.49 If, however,
there has been evidence on the issue and the defendant wants an
instruction on it, he must submit a formal written instruction to the
court. It is not enough to make an oral request.3° But if the written
instruction submitted is wrong in some aspect the judge is required
to formulate a correct instruction and submit it to the jury unless the
other instructions in the case adequately cover the issue.0
The instruction may include for the jury's consideration the facts
of physical or mental duress, threats or promises and inducements
which operate upon the mind or body of the defendant creating a
hope of escaping punishment or obtaining leniency. The jury is
allowed to consider the various factors which surround the making
of the confession. But the court has stated that an instruction which
states that illegal custody is one of the factors for the jury to con-
sider is faulty."
Since the confession is competent only if it is voluntary, it must be
rejected completely if the jury finds that it is involuntary, even
though it is believed that the confession is true.5z
44. State v. Gibilterra, 342 Mo. 577, 116 S.W.2d 88 (1938); State v. Menz, 341
Mo. 74, 106 S.W. 2d 440 (1937).
45. Ibid. See State v. Bradford, 262 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Mo. 1953).
46. Ibid.
47. MO. REV. STAT. § 546.070 (1949). See also State v. Lee, 361 Mo. 163, 233
S.W.2d 666 (1950); State v. Gibilterra, 342 Mo. 577, 116 S.W.2d 88 (1938); State
v. Menz, 341 Mo. 74, 106 S.W.2d 440 (1937).
48. State v. Higdon, 356 Mo. 1058, 204 S.W.2d 754 (1947); State v. Ramsey,
:{55 Mo. 720, 197 S.V.2d 949 (1946) ; State v. Gibilterra, 342 Mo. 577, 116 S.W.2d
88 (1938); State v. Menz, 341 Mo. 74, 106 S.W.2d 440 (1937).
49. State v. Higdon, 356 Mo. 1058, 204 S.W.2d 754 (1947); State v. Gibilterra,
'42 Mo. 577, 116 S.W.2d 88 (1938).
50. State v. Lee, 361 Mo. 163, 233 S.W.2d 666 (1950).
51. State v. Gibilterra, 342 Mo. 577, 116 S.W.2d 88 (1938).
52. See notes 31, 32 supra. See also State v. Gibilterra, 342 Mo. 577, 116 S.W.2d
88 (1938) ; State v. Menz, 341 Mo. 74, 106 S.W.2d 440 (1937).
53. State v. Gibilterra, 342 Mo. 577, 116 S.W.2d 88 (1938).
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